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Abstract
This paper studies the strategic consistency of various onymous voting
schemes. First the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is extended to read: all
stable, non-imposed social choice functions are oligarchic. Next, it is
shown that this result does not extend to collegial polities, even if
stability is replaced by strategic consistency in the sense of Peleg.
Finally, it is shown that the sincere outcome of a collegial polity is in
the core.
I. IntroductloQ
A great deal o£ effort has gone into alleviating the regrettable conse
quences of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: that every stable decisive
social choice function is dictatorial. Thus, Kelly [12] explores the conse
quences of relaxing decisiveness, while Peleg [14] and Dutta and Pattanaik
[3] introduce various notions of strategic consistency, in which the sincere
outcome stands in some determinate relation to the game outcome. This paper,
draws upon both these lines of research.
To describe the results, the framework of [14] is recalled. Let n be
the number of voters; m, the number of alternatives. Let all coalitions with
at leask k members be winning. A decisive social choice function is consistent
if, for every situation, there corresponds a strong equilibrium yielding the
same social choice. Peleg*s major result then is the following: a social
choice function is consistent if and only if
(1) k S [n(m-l)/m] + 1
where [ « ] denotes the least integer as great as the given expression.
Peleg*s construction has a number of reflections in the recent public
choice literature. First, the k/n requirement implies an (m-l)/m majority
against an alternative—the same condition as in the Ferejohn-Grether [5J
analysis of rational social choice functions. Thus, it provides a link
between rational social choice and strategically consistent social choice.
Second, k is the largest value that the votes against function can assume
and still an alternative be chosen by the minimax social choice function.
As Kramer has shown [13], the minimax social choice function exhibits an
interesting strategic equilibrium when m is infinite. However, when m is
finite, one has a consequence of Peleg's result that the minimax social
choice function is strategically inconsistent. Indeed, all Condorcet extension
functions, since their winning coalitions are all the majority coalitions, are
strategically inconsistent.
This paper considers the effect on Peleg's construction of relaxing two
important features of his construction: anonymity and decisiveness. A social
choice function is anonjraious if every voter has an equal chance of belonging
to a winning coalition. A social choice function is decisive if in all
situations it defines a unique social choice. Important examples of social
choice functions which are neither decisive nor anonymous are oligarchies and
collegial polities [2]. These mechanisms are found to have the following
properties. All stable, non-imposed social choice functions are oligarchic
(Theorem 1), a result which in fact extends the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem. Collegial polities, on the other hand, are neither stable nor
strategically consistent in the sense of Peleg (Theorem 2). However, collegial
polities are core consistent (Theorem 3).
II. stability and Oligarchy
Let X be the set of social states, with typical members x, y, z. Let
N = \lt 2, n} be the set of voters. R is the space of complete,
reflexive, and transitive orderings of X; P c R is the subspace of linear
orderings. A social choice function is a mapping F, from such that
F(a) ^ 0, F(a) c X for any situation a « (R,, R , ..., R ).
12 n
The strategic voting model views a social choice function as the outcome
function of a cooperative game in normal form. Thus, each player i has as
his strategy space R, his true preferences being a point R* in that space.
In order for a voter to assess the results of different strategies, it is
necessary to compare different choice sets. The set relation chosen to do
this is as follows [7]:
Definition. Let A and B be non-empty subsets of X. Let individual i have
the ordering R^. Then A^ Bif and only if EU^(A) > EU^(B), for all
utility functions that fit R^, where the expectation is taken over uniform
probability distributions of A and B respectively.
The idea behind this definition is that judgments between sets of alternatives
be clear cut, in the sense that any expected utility maximizer with the order
ing R^, regardless of the intensity of preferences, prefers, one set to the
other when ties are broken by even-chance lotteries. This ordering represents
an extension of Kelly's ordering [12, p, 441]. For example a voter preferring
X to y to z has the R relation.
» X, y
z
the arrows denoting set preference.^
Let a be a given situation, with F(a) = B. F is stable at a if there
exists no coalition S, 0 ^ S c N, and situation b 7^ a, such that
(i) a^ - b^ for all i in N-S
(ii) F(b) R. F(a) for all i in S.
If F is stable at every situation, F is stable.
F is strategically consistent [14, p. 156] if there exists a mapping
H: -» such that
(i) H(a) is stable
(ii) FoH(a) = F(a)
for every situation a. Clearly if F is stable F is strategically consistent;
simply take H to be the identity mapping. A strategically consistent social
choice function need not be stable; but, given the transformation H, stability
is achieved.^
A social choice function F is not imposed if for every non-empty subset
of alternatives B c X, there exists a situation a such that F(a) = B.
In order to introduce the idea of oligarchy, it is necessary to introduce
that of social preference relation. Define the social .preference relation P
by the equation
(2) F(a) = jx in X: there is no y in X such that yPxj
Some useful conditions on F are as follows:
Quasi-transitivity: xPy and yPz, then xPz
Pareto optimality: xP^y for all i, then xPy
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Let a, a' be two situations.
If xP^y if and only if xP^y and yP^x if and only if yPj^x for all i, then
xPy if and only if xP'y.
A coalition S is decisive if, whenever all the members of S prefer x to y,
then xPy. Fareto optimality thus means that the grand coalition is decisive.
A filter 7] is a collection of subsets of N such that: (a) N e T], (b) d V T]
(c) e e 11 then 0 S2 e T], (d) e Tl, c: S2, then s J\.
A basic result connecting these various ideas is Hansson's Theorem
[11, p. 96].
Theorem (Hansson). The sets decisive with respect to a group preference
function satisfying the conditions of quasitransitivity, Fareto optimality,
and independence of Irrelevant alternatives form a filter.
The smallest decisive set in a filter pne can Identify as the oligarchy.
Only the members of this set have voting power. An oligarchic social choice
function then is one whose decisive sets form a filter, the smallest member
of which is a subset of N. If this smallest set is a singleton, then the
social choice function is dictatorial. If this smallest subset is all of N,
the socil choice function is unanimous. In between, one has more or less
extensive oligarchy,^
One can now assert the following result:
Theorem 1.. Let n S 2, m s 3. Then all stable, non-imposed social choice
functions are oligarchic.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to show that a stable, non-imposed social
choice function generates a social preference relation satisfying the hypothesis
of Hansson*s theorem. The proof itself is modeled after that of Gibbard [9].^
Let a be a given situation in R". Let Q in P" be fixed. Then a*(x, y)
denotes that x and y have been moved to the top of each ordering in situation
a, preserving the ordering between them if it is strict, while the rest of
each ordering agrees with Q. Ties between x and y are also broken by Q.
Define the social preference relation P relative to situation a, P(a), by
(3) xP(a)y if and only if x ^ y & jxj = F(a*(x, y)).
Some properties of P(a) are now generated by a series of leimnas.
Lemma 1. Let a « (R,, R«, R ), b - (R', R', .... R') be two situations
i z n 1 z n
such that for all i, xP^y if and only if xPj^y and if and only if yP^x.
Then xP(a)y if and only if xP(b)y.
Proof. By construction, a*(x, y) = b*(x, y); hence, F(a*(x, y)) = F(b*(x, y)) .
Therefore, by (3) xP(a)y if and only if xP(b)y.
Lemma 2. Given, situation a and alternatives x, y, suppose a' is another
situation such that
(i) yP.X, then R. = Rl for all i
i 1 1
(ii) xP^y or yP^x for all i
(iii) xP(a)y.
Then jxj ^ F(a') .
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that jxj = F(a*). It is first shown that
jxj =F(a'*(x, y)). By construction, at situation a'*(x, y), xP^z, yP^z
for all i and all z in X - jx, yj. It follows then that jzj ^ B= F(a'*'(x, y)).
For if zj = B, there exists by non-imposition a situation b at which
F(b) - jxj, and so F is unstable at a'*(x, y). If |x, z] = B, then there
exists a situation b at which F(b) = jxj. Since jxj R jx, zj for all individ
uals at a'*(x, y), F is again unstable there. A similar argument holds for
S = jy, zj. Finally, if B = jx, y, zj, there exists a situation b at which
F(b) = jx, yj and jx, yj R jx, y, zj for all individuals at a'*(x, y), making
F unstable, Thierefore, B must be either jx
or , yj or jyj. Since a'(x, y)
agrees with a' on the pair (x, y), Lemma 1 requires that x,j = B.
Now consider the situation aA(x, y) = a". By Lennna 1 and the argument
just made, F(a") = (y| or = |x, yj. By construction, a" and a'A(x, y) have
R[ = for all i preferring y to x. If F(a") = jyj, then F is unstable at
a", since the agents preferring x to y have altered preferences to reach
a'(x, y), and for those agents x Ry. Likewise, if F(a") = jx, y}, F is
unstable at a", since jxj R jx, y| for agents preferring x to y.
This contradiction proves that jx| ^ F(a').
Corollary 1. If xP^y for all i in situation a, then xp(a)y.
Proof. There exists a situation a' at which F(a') = jx|. For any situation
^ satisfying the hjrpothesis, conditions (i) and (ii) of lemma 2 are satisfied,
but the conclusion is contradicted. Therefore, xP(a)y, that is, xP(a)y.
Corollary 2. xl.y for all i and - xP(a)y, then |x} f F(a).
Proof. Conditions (ii) and (iii) of lemma 2 are satisfied. Let a' = a.
Then condition (i) is satisfied. Hence, F(a') « F(a) ^ (x).
Lemma 3. P(a) is quasitransitive.
It is sufficient to show that for a' = a*(x, y, z), xP(a')y and yP(a')2 imply
xP(a )z. It will be shown that F(a') » x under the given hypothesis. Then,
by corollary 2 to lemma 2, xp(a')z.
Suppose instead that F(a') = jy]. Let a" « a'*(x, y). By lemma 1,
F(a") - jyj. Then, by corollary 2 to lemma 2, yP(a")x. But a" agrees with
a' on (X, y); hence a contradiction. Asimilar argument holds for F(a') - (x, y
and F(a') = jx, y, z\.
Suppose then that F(a') = jz). Let a" a'*(y, z). By lemma 1. F(a")
\z\. By corollary 2 to lemma 2, zP(a")y. But a" agrees with a' on (y, z);
hence a contradiction. Asimilar argument holds for F(a') « jx, zj.
All other cases having been exhausted, F(a*) is indeed jx).
8Proof of Theorem 1. Let F be a stable, non-imposed social choice function.
F generates a group preference function via (3). From lemma 3, quasi-transi-
!
tivity is satisfied; from lemma 2, corollary 1, Pareto optimality; from
lemma 1, independence of irrelevant alternatives. Therefore, by Hansson's
theorem, the decisive sets with respect to F form a filter.
If one requires in addition that the social choice function in this
theorem be decisive, one can then show full transitivity of the social
preference relation, not just quasi-transitivity. This case then implies
that the oligarchy is a dictatorship. This is the sense in which theorem
.1 generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
III. Collegial- Polity and Strategic Consistency
In the propf of theorem 1, no use was made of the notion of strategic
consistency; indeed, one might hope that by using, that concept, the result
could be generalized to an even larger class of-onjnnous social choice
functions. The natural extension of an oligarchy is a collegial polity.
In a collegial polity the intersection condition for a filter T] is relaxed
to read
(4) e Tl, e then ^ 0.
The intersection of all decisive sets then is the college. Examples of
collegial polities are the Roman republic and the United Nations Security
Council before 1965 [2]. In the former, the ten tribunes coit^rised the
college; in the latter, the five nations'with a veto.
The hope that non-imposed, strategically consistent social choice
functions are collegial polities is furthered by the positive result for .,
m = 2. For simplicity, consider the case of 3 voters. Table 1 compares
two ollgarchies-V = l|l, .2^ 3|| and ={(l, Z\, jl, 2. 3}l--wlth the '
collegial polity jjl, 2j, jl, 3|, jl, 2, 3||. As is clear from the table,
the collegial polity is stable. Moreover it is rather more decisive than
either oligarchy. Unfortunately, when there are more than 2 alternatives,
collegial polities are in general not strategically consistent.
To show thiSj one first adds the following structure to the set of
voters N. Let 0 C c N be the college, and let the set.of decisive
coalitions he ^ jS: S c N, Cc s, p.(S) ^ kj, where n/2 £ k £ n is a
fixed constant and is the counting measure. For example, k = 160 (n = 310)
in the Roman republic, while k = 7 (n = 11) in the pre-1965 United Nations
Security Council. In particular, k might be given by formula (1).
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Table 1. Outcome Function for Oligarchy and
Collegial Polity when m = 2
Structure .9 q
T1 T1
References
(x. X, X) X X X
(x. X, y) X, y X X
(x. y, X) X, y X, y X
(X, y> y) X, y X, y X,
(y, X, X) X, y X, y X,
(y, X, y) X, y X, y y
(y, y, X) X, y y y
(y, y, y) y y y
(•, * 3 •) represents top choice of each voter
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One can now assert the following:
«
Theorfem 2. Sane collegial polities are strategically Inconsistent, if
|a(C) < k and m > 2.
Proof. A counterexample is constructed for the case m = 3. The counter
example is easily extended to larger m.
Let C, and S2 be mutually disjoint coalitions whose union equals
N. Moreover, p,(C U ^ k and p,(C US2) ^ k. All members of C have the
preferences xPyPz; S^, zPxPy; S2, yPzPx. Denote this situation a. The
sincere outcome is |x|, since CU yields xP(a)y and CUS2 yields yP(a)z.
The social choice function is not strategically consistent at a. If
it were, there would exist a mapping H: -» such that H(a) were a strong
equilibrium and FoH(a) = jx|. For the social choice to be jx], all the
members of C must rank x first. Then, regardless of where H maps the /
strategies of U S2> instability arises. By unanimously announcing the
preferences zPxPy, US2 can reach the outcome jx, zj, and jx, zj'R {xj for
all members of US2.
The crucial feature of the construction in theorem 2 is that the voters
outside the college are divided, in the sense that some rank the college's
first choice last, while others rank it next to last. Exploiting this
feature leads to an analogous result for general m.
I
The negative tone of Theorem 2 is somewhat mitigated by the following
result:
Theorem 3. The sincere outcome of a collegial polity is in the core.
Proof. Let B be the sincere choice set. It suffices to show that no decisive
coalition can improve upon B. Suppose on the contrary that some decisive
coalition S can assure itself of B' and B* RB for all members of S. By
12
definition, C c: S. By sincerity, B includes the set of college-rational social
states. B' must also Include this set of social states; otherwise B' R B
for some member of the college. Since B' 7^ B, B' must delete some non-college-
rational social state. However, this is a deletion that cannot benefit a^ of
S, since B already reflects ail such deletions.
For exanq>le, in the example of theorem 2, it is easy to check that the
core equals jjx], |x, zj, jx, y, x|], which includes the sincere outcome
xl.
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Footnotes
1. R is given more formally as follows. Let Dom^^Cx, A) = jy in A: xPyj.
Then ARBif and only if, for all x in AUB, |i,(Dom^(x, A))/p((A) <
P((Doraj^(x, B))/p,(B), where is counting measure. For details, see [7].
2. This notion of stability corresponds to the notion of equilibrium of
every order in [4].
3. The significance of this interval is especially stressed by [10, p. 583]
4. This result does not contradict that of Gibbard in [8], where a much
less demanding notion of manipulability" than R is used.
14
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